Thornell v. Jones (Ineffective Assistance)

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Thornell v. Jones
Respondent Danny Lee Jones was convicted of the premeditated firstdegree murders of Robert and Tisha Weaver and the attempted premeditated murder of Robert’s grandmother Katherine Gumina. Arizona law at the time required the trial court to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E). The trial court found three aggravating circumstances that applied to both Robert’s and Tisha’s murders: Jones committed multiple homicides, §13– 703(F)(8); he was motivated by “pecuniary” gain, §13–703(F)(5); and the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved,” §13– 703(F)(6). The trial court found an additional aggravating circumstance with respect to Tisha’s murder: she was a young child, §13– 703(F)(9). The trial court also concluded that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: long-term substance abuse, drug and alcohol impairment at the time of the murders, head trauma, and childhood abuse. 9 Record 2465. The court concluded that these mitigating circumstances were “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it sentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.” 185 Ariz. 471, 492, 917 P. 2d 200, 221. Jones later sought state postconviction review on the theory that defense counsel was ineffective, but the Arizona courts rejected Jones’s claims. Jones next filed a federal habeas petition in District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could not show prejudice because the additional information he presented “ ‘barely. . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.’ ” Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 700). The Ninth Circuit reversed, but this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v. Jones, 563 U. S. 932. On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v. Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1137. Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc review. One dissent, joined by eight judges, asserted that the Ninth Circuit panel flouted Strickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulative mitigation evidence” as “enough to overcome . . . weight[y] . . . aggravating circumstances.” Id., at 1155. Held: The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of Strickland was in error.
Reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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