Israel's New Wars by Ehud Eilam

Wavell Room Audio Reads

Israel's New Wars is the latest book by Dr. Ehud Eilam. For nearly three decades, Eilam has studied Israel's national security and written widely, including for the Wavell Room, about how the state should protect itself.
In Israel's New Wars, Eilam explores how recent conflict with Iran and its partners has differed from Israel's fighting between 1948 and 1982. It contrasts fighting conventionally and fighting non-state actors, bringing historical perspective andmes. As a book, it is focused more on the tactical aspect of military power but verges on identifying the operational thinking.
Several of Eilam's arguments standout.
How to prepare?
Common with contemporary Western military thinking, Israel's New Wars finds a tension between exactly what type of war to prepare for. The day-to-day operations on the border or major conventional operations? This is a tension that the Israeli Defence Force has been struggling with as they veer from conflict to conflict. This is a trend that is apparent when contrasting the periods of history he uses.
This tension also carries over into equipment. Looking, for example, Israel's armour, he finds a very good system of upgrades for main battle tanks. However, upgrading to defeat one threat means they are less well prepared against others. This seem more consistent with Israeli naval power or air upgrades. There are similar trends in training and how to prepare soldiers for mobilisation effectively.
Whilst Eilam doesn't say it directly, he strongly implies that Israel's inability to prepare for either properly impacted its performance, ultimately leading to multiple draws in recent fighting. Earlier fighting ended in more decisive victory.
Ground holding or precision strike?
The book also explores the tensions of the different military strategies required. For example, conventional wars require large ground-holding operations and/or air strikes. Fighting non-state actions, however, does not. While air power is important to both, he presents an interesting discussion about the continuing utility of tubed artillery and its importance to effective military operations in both forms of operation.
Another theme explored is deterrence. Eilam finds that Israel has a mixed record of deterrence. Israel has been more effective with conventional deterrence, with some success against non-state actors. However, the disparate nature of such actors often means that miscalculation leads to war or splinter groups provoke unneeded responses.
Operational - Strategic
This is perhaps an area where Eilam would benefit from more analysis. The book is generally tactical in its nature. It struggles to view the problems from the perspective of Israel's opponents when discussing why deterrence hasn't been effective. This theme is common in much security writing, and the baseline assumption seems to be that deterrence rests on destroying lots of the enemy. If, as he identifies, it doesn't work well, what does?
Another limitation stems from this: the link between the tactical and operational. Eilam does draw some operational considerations, even some strategic ones. However, they feel underdeveloped. This is unfair; Israel's New Wars did not set out to be a full analysis. Such a task would be near impossible. But focusing on destroying things or holding ground would benefit from a little more strategic thinking.
We suggest that there are deeper considerations for Israeli military thinkers out there when contrasting the wars that he seeks to do. In some ways, Eilam's line of thought is a mirror of Mary Kaldor's infamous 'new wars' theory of the 1990s. Perhaps our thinking should now be beyond that now and we wonder if Israel's New Wars was a missed opportunity to consider how balance the competiting demands of conflict.
From a NATO perspective, Eilam is right to identify the tension and differences in the type of war faced then and now and how they are consistent. A decade after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the military...